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11 Introduction
Reputation effects are crucial elements in many interesting economic relationships.
For instance, reputation may support foreign investments in developing countries,
contribute to maintain quality in ’experience good’ markets, or deter potential
competitors in monopolistic local markets. However, it has proven difﬁcult to
model such phenomena in ﬁnite and inﬁnite horizon.1 In inﬁnitely repeated games,
an implication of the Folk theorem is that there exist multiple rational equilibria
supporting almost all types of behavior, cooperation as well as defection, toughness
and fairness. As a result, the predictive power of the theory may be sharply reduced.
In particular, we cannot identify situations in which reputation represents a signiﬁcant
factor in determining the outcome of the game.
This paper investigates the role of imitation and selective matching in supporting
the reputation-building dynamics in inﬁnitely repeated games with an outside option
(GOO). In these games, which are traditional models of reputation, a sequence of
short-run players (buyers or investors) ﬁrst select whether to play a game with a long-
run player (a ﬁrm or a country) or not. An exit option is therefore available to short-
run players. Due to this outside option, competition between long-run players seems
a natural setting for most of GOO: consumers can use their outside option to freely
switch ﬁrms, or countries may compete for attracting investors. However, most studies
on reputation formation have considered GOO in isolation, building models where a
single long-run player faces a sequence of short-run players.2 This occults two of the
main ingredients of the whole story: (1) social learning, that is the opportunity to learn
from others (especially for long-run players), and (2) selective matching, that is short-
run players’ possibility to select the long-run player they play against, when several
1See Selten (1978), Kreps and Wilson (1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Fudenberg and
Levine (1989, 1992).
2 Notable exceptions are Jackson and Kalai (1999) and Hörner (2002).
2long-run players are simultaneously considered.
In this paper, I use an evolutionary game model integrating both social learning
(by way of imitation) and selective matching. Here, a ﬁnite population of long-run
players repeatedly face a population of short-run players. Both types of players are
boundedly rational agents who learn by imitating successful others. This follows a
growing and recent literature on evolutionary games, in which players are assumed to
imitate successful behaviors.3 Some empirical studies have showed that imitation is
a good approximation of economic behaviors in a variety of contexts.4 Alternatively,
some papers such as Kandori and Rob (1995) have assumed best response dynamics.
Imitation dynamics requires less information on the structure of the game, and thus
is more appropriate in a very complex environment where agents seek to minimize
decision costs. The matching process between short-run and long-run players is
speciﬁed following two polar scenarios: the random matching scenario, where short-
run and long-run players are randomly matched, and the selective matching scenario,
where a short-run player selects the long-run player he plays against. I use the random
(pairwise) matching scenario as a benchmark as it is one of the two usual matching
processes in evolutionary models.5 The selective matching scenario gives short-run
players some control over who they play against. This selection is endogenously
incorporated in the model by assuming that short-run players strategy consists of
choosing an action (enter the subgame or not) and of selecting a long-run player.
1.1 Motivations
Evolutionary game theory is an appropriate tool for capturing social learning and
selective matching. First, evolutionary models consider populations of boundedly
3See Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996), Vega-Redondo (1997), Tanaka (1999) or Alós-Ferrer (2004)
for instance.
4See Offerman and Sonnemans (1998) and Pingle and Day (1996).
5The other matching process is the so-called playing-the-ﬁeld. See for instance Vega-Redondo (1997)
for a description of the differences between both matching processes.
3rational agents who are repeatedly matched in pairs to play a deﬁned stage game.
Thus, there are several repeated games played simultaneously which allows players to
learn not only from their own experience but also from the experience of the others’
choices. As in Jackson and Kalai (1999), we examine reputational games when such
games are not played in isolation, but instead a player may learn from the other players
by observing how they are playing the game.
Evolutionary game theory is also an ideal setup for analyzing matching processes.
Duetothe simultaneity of games, evolutionary models have tomake someassumptions
as to how players meet in each stage game. Literature offers various speciﬁcations
regarding the matching mechanism and, as Oechssler (1997) and Robson and Vega-
Redondo (1996) showed, evolutionary models are quite sensitive to the speciﬁcation
of the matching process. In a general way, one may deﬁne two models of matching:
the fully global selection model and the group selection model. In the former,
interaction takes place within the entire population, where individuals are randomly
matched to play a bilateral game6. In contrast, the second model of matching assumes
that interaction takes place within relatively small subpopulations, where there is
infrequent migration between subpopulations7. Both models share the assumption
that the matching mechanism relies on a perfectly random process, removing selective
considerations like group or partner choice. Recently however, some evolutionary
models have included the possibility of selective considerations in the matching
process. For instance, Oechssler (1997) studies the coordination problem in a
population partitioned into groups, where players can not only choose which action to
take in the game, but also which group they want to join. Similarly, Bergstrom (2003)
explores the possibility of partner choice in a multiplayer prisoners’ dilemma game
with voluntary matching. Larson (2004) also integrates selective matching in an
6For more details on this class of matching mechanisms, see Fudenberg and Levine (1998).
7 Biologists call this class of models Haystack models. See Bergstrom (2002).
4evolutionary model, giving agents some control over who they play against. Our paper
follows this line of research.
Using the bounded rationality set-up offered by evolutionary game theory, we
follow the Selten (1978) intuition which underlies the necessity of a limited rationality
approach in order to capture reputation effects. Furthermore, as noted by Abreu and
Sethi (2003), traditional literature on reputation in games considers the possibility of
one or more boundedly rational players leaving unexplained the particular form of
irrationality assumed. Modelling reputation formation with evolutionary game theory
may provide the theory with formal descriptions of boundedly rational behaviors.
1.2 Results and Predictions
Selective matching and imitation may play a key role in the analysis of reputation in
GOO. We ﬁnd that they support the equilibrium associated to reputation as the long-
run equilibrium in the ultimatum game. However, in the trust game, the long-run
outcome remains the subgame perfect equilibrium, under both random and selective
matchings. This is because the selective short-run players reaction is too low in
punishing defectors and then, as players are concerned about relative payoffs in
imitation dynamics, players continue imitating those who reject cooperation. Even
if our model cannot produce a clear-cut selection between equilibria based on the
sole matching and learning considerations, it shows that, unlike the random matching
benchmark, selective matching does not always favor subgame perfection.
Our result are very closed of that obtained by Gale, Binmore and Samuel-
son (1995), who are motivated by similar concerns. They study a simple learning
model (coming from the replicator dynamics) to which is added a source of noise:
players may "mistakenly learn to play a strategy that is adapted to the wrong game".
Under some asymmetric conditions, the model also shows that, applied to the ultima-
tum game, such a learning process leads to outcomes that are Nash equilibria but not
5subgame-perfect.
1.3 Possible applications
The model developed in this paper is applicable in several economic situations, as
many GOO implicitly contain the idea of selective matching. For instance, the quality
game represents a situation in which the short-run player begins by choosing whether
or not to purchase a good from the long-run player, who in turn can produce high
quality or low (see Klein and Lefﬂer (1981), Shapiro (1983), Holmstrom (1999)).8
Considering a competitive setting, that is several long-run players, provides short-
run players with the possibility of selective matching. Another interesting economic
situation is the sovereign problem of foreign direct investment in less developed
countries (see Eaton and Gersovitz (1983), Raff (1992)). Such investments are prone
to the sovereign risk because they are sunk and then the host country may expropriate
the owner without compensation or unilaterally change its tax policy. This situation
may be described by the investment or trust game which is a reputational game with an
outside option. Here, the outside option (to invest abroad) gives rise to the possibility
of selective matching. Finally, even the chain-store game may be considered with
selective matching: as incumbent ﬁrms are viewed as local monopolists, potential
competitors may choose the local market into which they will move.
1.4 Organisation of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 derives results under random and selective matching. Section 4 discusses the results
and suggests some extensions. Section 5 concludes.
8 The same game is used in price dispersion models. See Salop and Stiglitz (1977).
62 The model
We consider two large but ﬁnite sets of long-run and short-run players9, respectively
denoted L = {1,...,I,...,N} and S = {1,...,i,...,n}.L e t N = n.10 Players I and i are
repeatedly matched to play a stage game and adjust their behavior over time. The
model consists of four elements: (1) an underlying game that describes the basic
strategic environment; (2) a matching process specifying how players are paired to
play the underlying game; (3) a learning mechanism that describes how agents learn
about different strategies and sometimes switch to them; (4) a mutation mechanism
that integrates some perturbations in the learning mechanism. These elements are
described in turn in this section.
2.1 The underlying game
We focus on two-player games with an outside option. These games describe situa-










where (a, b, c)a n d( A, B, C) respectively denote players i and I payoffs. Player i may
either choose to enter the subgame (E)ortake his outside option (O). If player idecides
to enter, the long-run player has the option to cooperate (Co) or to reject cooperation
(R). For our purposes, there are two types of generic games with an outside option. I
9 We keep here the denomination "short-run" and "long-run" players only for convenience as all
players repeatedly play the game.
10 As it will be easy to see, allowing population sizes to be different do not alter the results of the
model, but highly complexiﬁes their exposition.
7will ﬁrst consider pure strategy equilibria.
(i)T h etrust game11,i nw h i c hb > a > c and C > B > A. This game has the same
strategic structure as the quality (or price dispersion) game and the investment game.
In the trust game, (O,R) constitutes the only Nash equilibrium of the game in pure
strategy, which is also a subgame perfect equilibrium. Notice that outcome (E,Co),
which is not a Nash equilibrium, Pareto-dominates (O,R), meaning that self-interested
behavior makes everyone worse off. In a context of perfect rationality, when the game
is repeated, the expected outcome to be sustained by reputation effects is (E,Co).
(ii)T h eultimatum (mini)game, with b>a>c and A>B>C. In that game we can see
player i as making either a high offer, O,o ral o wo f f e r ,E. The high offer is assumed
to be always accepted (as A > B > C). After E,p l a y e rI can either cooperate (Co)
or reject the offer (R). This game is also similar to the chain-store game. It has two
Nash equilibria (O,R) and (E,Co), with the latter subgame perfect. Thus, unlike the
trust game, (E,Co) is a Nash equilibrium but here (O,R) is the expected outcome with
reputation effects when the game is repeated. It turns out that this outcome is also a
focal point in laboratory experiments.12
When mixed strategies are added to the analysis, both game types have a
component of Nash equilibria. Let Ωi and ΩI stand for strategy spaces. Denote by
Σi = Δ(Ωi) and ΣI = Δ(ΩI) the spaces of mixed strategy of each type of player, with
generic elements σi ∈ Σi and σI ∈ ΣI. Without loss of generality, let c = 0. Both
type games have a continuum of Nash equilibria, which containing equilibrium (O,R),
11See Kreps (1990).
12See Binmore et al. (1995).
8given by






where player i takes its outside option, and player I chooses strategy Co with
probability at most a/b.
2.2 The matching process
Time is measured discretely and indexed by t = 1,2,3.... At period t,p l a y e ri ∈ S is
paired with player I ∈ L to play the generic game described above. I consider two
polar scenarios describing the matching process between players i and I:
• The random matching scenario, in which each player i is randomly matched with
exactly one player I to play the generic game once in each period. As N = n, each
player I play also the game once in each period.
• The selective matching scenario, where player i selects the long-run player I he
plays against. The way player i operates the selection is described in the next section
(it is part of the learning mechanism). Due to the selection component here player I
may be confronted with several players i∈S (all having chosen I), meaning that player
I may here play the game several times in one period. All players i play once in each
period.
The random matching scenario provides the analysis with a benchmark case, as
random matching is the usual assumption in evolutionary models. Notice that, in
the selective matching, long-run players act as in the random matching scenario.
From their point of view, the matching only follows a random process even if
short-run players are selective. The main reason supporting this assumption is that
9long-run players have no outside option in GOO, meaning that they don’t play an
active role in the matching process. Note also that both scenarios suppose different
degrees of sophistication for short-run players, since selective matching requires more
information about long-run players. We will discuss this in Section 5.
2.3 The learning mechanism
The learning mechanism speciﬁes how players choose their strategies. Following
Vega-Redondo (1997), I will consider an imitation dynamics in which players simply
mimic the strategy of the most successful players.13 Thus, they are assumed to be
myopic14 and adaptive. Agents do not form expectations about the future course
of play and take into account the decisions made in the past to determine their
strategies. This means that changing from one strategy to another is dictated by such
considerations as: How well do I perform compared to the other players? What is the
strategy used by the most successful players?
We are interested in the description of the behavior adopted by the players in the
long-run. Let zt =( zs
t,zl
t) ∈ Z ≡{ z =( zs,zl) :0≤ zs ≤ n, 0 ≤ zl ≤ N} be the state at
t of the evolutionary dynamics, where zs
t and zl
t represent respectively the number of
players using O in population S and using R in population L. For convenience, states
z1 =( n,N), z2 =( 0,0), z3 =( 0,N) and z4 =( n,0) will be directly written z1 =( O,R),
z2 =( E,Co), z3 =( E,R) and z4 =( O,Co).
Let Xt =( X1t,...,XIt,...,XNt) represent the strategy-proﬁle of long-run players at
period t, with XIt ∈{ Co,R}. In the same way, deﬁne xt =( x1t,...,xit,...,xnt) as the
strategy-proﬁle of short-run players at t,w h e r exit ∈{ O,E} in the random matching
scenario and xit =(ait,I)with ait ∈{O,E}and I ∈Linthe selective matching scenario.
This is because xit consists of choosing an action ait ∈{ O,E} and of selecting a
13 Alternatively, evolutionary games consider best response dynamics which, relative to imitation
dynamics, required much more information (as players need to know the whole structure of the game).
14On the justiﬁcation of the myopic assumption, see Section 5.
10long-run player I ∈ L when the matching is selective.15 Consequently, player i’s
strategy is a couple xit =( ait,I) in the selective matching scenario. Deﬁne also the
payoff-proﬁles associated respectively to xt and Xt as πt =( π1t,...,πit,...,πnt) and
Πt =( Π1t,...,ΠIt,...,ΠNt).
At the beginning of each period, all players i and I choose a pure strategy and
sticks to it for the duration of the period. In the random matching model, players play
exactly once in each period so that both πit and ΠIt depend on the strategies of the two
randomly matched partners.
In the case of selective matching, as indicated above, player I may be confronted
with several players i, having chosen I ∈ L in their strategy. Thus, ΠIt depends not
only on XIt and xit with xit =( E,I), but also on the number of players i having chosen
I.L e tSI,t ≡{ i ∈ S : xit =( E,I)}⊆S be the subset of players i having chosen I at t,





0i f SI,t = / 0 ∀XIt,
|SI,t| B if XIt =Co and SI,t  = / 0,
|SI,t|C if XIt = R and SI,t  = / 0.
in which A is normalized to zero. This allows us to eliminate the payoff increase
resulting from attracting more competitors in the ultimatum game, which is not
appropriate in that case. Fixing A = 0 eliminates this effect.
At period t +1, player i ∈ S observes (xt,πt), that is all previous payoffs in S with
the corresponding strategies. Similarly, player I ∈ L observes (Xt,Πt).P l a y e ri ∈ S
(respectively player I ∈ L) is assumed to ﬁnd the maximal payoff in πt (respectively
Πt) and then imitate the corresponding strategy. Formally, player i∈S chooses xkt ∈xt
such that
k ∈ argmaxj∈S {πjt}. (1)
15 Following Oechssler (1997), E and O are called actions since in our model of selective matching
short-run players strategy indicates both a long-run player and an action choice.
11In the same way, player I ∈ L chooses XKt ∈ Xt such that
K ∈ argmaxJ∈L {ΠJt}. (2)
LetBS(t−1)={xkt−1 ∈xt :πkt−1 ≥πjt−1,∀j∈S}bethe set ofstrategies achieving
the highest payoff in S at the previous period. When BS(t −1) is not a singleton,
that is when several strategies give the maximal payoff, one of them is chosen at
random according to a probability distribution with full support on BS(t −1).T h e
same assumption applies to population L.
Games with an outside option have a particular strategic structure in which a long-
run player facing no effective entry (i.e., only facing O-users) does not reveal his
strategy. This is the case in most extensive-form games where some of the information
sets may not have been reached. In such a situation, the very last behavior of a long-
run player can not be observed by other long-run players and thus can not generate
imitation.16 For the sake of simplicity here, I assume that when the strategy of a long-
run player is not revealed at a given period, it is considered as unmodiﬁed relative to
the last time it could be observed. Formally,
Assumption 1 When XIt−1 ∈ Xt−1 cannot be observed at the beginning of t, then
XIt−1 = XIτ with τ < t the last period in which player I ∈ L faced an E-user.
Thus, in such a case, player J looking at the performance of player I at the beginning
oft considers the couple (XIτ,Πt−1), that is the last observable strategy with the payoff
just realized. When τ does not exist (for instance at the very beginning of the game),
one may assume that players select their strategies at random in order to ﬁrst obtain
information about them and then follow the imitation dynamics.
16 Most evolutionary game models postulate that agents simply look at the immediate past and use
it as a one-point predictor of what will happen next. This is called static expectations. Young (1993)
was the ﬁrst to introduce a process of expectation formation into stochastic evolutionary models. As
extensive-form games may present unreached information sets, evolutionary models investigating these
games have proposed an extension of the static-expectations approach. See for instance Nöldeke and
Samuelson (1993) who developed the analysis of evolutionary stability in extensive form games.
12Inertia is an important aspect of evolutionary models. They consider that not
all agents react instantaneously to their environment but rather gradually adjust their
strategy following the learning mechanism. Formally, each player independently with
some ﬁxed probability φ∈ (0,1] receives the opportunity to update his strategy in each
given period. As we will see in Section 5, assuming different levels of inertia in S and
L may have an incidence on the results of the evolutionary dynamics.
2.4 Mutations
Besides the learning mechanism, mutation is the other force acting on agents’
strategies. It refers to a situation where an individual randomly switches to a new
strategy. After the completion of the learning adjustment, each agent independently
changes his strategy with a small probability ε. The learning process is then
perturbed17. In economic contexts, the mutation phenomenon may be interpreted as
experimentation of non-optimal strategies, in the sense of (1)-(2), or the entry of a new
player who knows nothing about the game.18
Learning dynamics (1)-(2) combined with the mutation mechanism generate a
Markov chain over the ﬁnite state space Z. The existence of a small probability ε > 0
ensures that the process has a unique stationary distribution summarizing the long-
run behavior of the system, regardless of initial conditions.19 The latter characteristic
of the model is particularly interesting when the learning mechanism presents several
stationary states (which is the case here as we will see in the next section), since it
may permit a selection to be made between them. Our goal is to ﬁnd the stochastically
stable state or the long-run equilibrium (LRE) of the game assuming that ε → 0. We
have to compute the number of mutations required in the transitions between absorbing
states of the learning mechanism. The LRE is simply the one requiring the fewest
17As mentioned by Samuelson (1997), mutation is a residual capturing whatever has been excluded
when modelling selection.
18 On this point, see Canning (1989).
19See Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993).
13mutations.20
Notice that mutation effects may be limited in extensive-form games. As
mentioned in Section 2.3, in such games information sets may not have been reached.
Consequently, if a mutation changes an agent’s strategy at a decision node that is not
currently reached, then this has no effect on the agent’s payoff and is not observed by
others (and thus cannot generate imitation). This has some consequences on the result
of the model.
3A n a l y s i s
In this section, we characterize the long-run behavior of the evolutionary dynamics
considering both random and selective matching processes. We ﬁnd that selective
matching has important implications on the LRE of the dynamics.
In the framework of the imitation rule considered here, extinct strategies are
required to remain extinct without mutations.21 This means that in monomorphic
states, i.e., states in which all players use the same strategy, the learning mechanism
cannot bring (alone) new strategies in the population. In such states players cannot
observe the gain of an unplayed strategy so that they cannot imitate it.
Let T0(z,z ) be the transition matrix of dynamics (1)-(2) between states z,z  ∈ Z;
the corresponding m-step transition matrix is denoted by Tm
0 (z,z ). As customary, we
deﬁne a limit set A ⊂ Z of the imitation dynamics, that is a set containing absorbing
states, as a closed set under ﬁnite chains of positive-probability transitions. Formally,
a set A ⊂ Z is a limit set if
(1) ∀z ∈ A,∀z  / ∈ A,T0(z,z )=0,
20For more details on this result, see Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) or Samuelson (1997) or Vega-
Redondo (1996).
21 This follows the Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996) model as well as the biologists formulation
of evolutionary dynamics. However, it constitutes a point of departure with Kandori, Mailath and
Rob (1993). On this point, see Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996).
14(2) ∀z,z  ∈ A,∃m ∈ N such that Tm
0 (z,z ) > 0.
Denote by A the collection of limit sets of the imitation dynamics. When A is a sin-
gleton, for instance A = {z∗}, learning mechanism (1)-(2) cannot escape from {z∗}
without experimentation or mutation, so it remains in {z∗} forever. We can state the
following result.
Proposition 1 Under random matching, A = {{zq} : q = 1,2,3,4} in any type of
games with an outside option. Under selective matching, we ﬁnd that A = {{zq} :
q = 1,2,3,4} in the ultimatum game, and A = {{zq} : q = 1,2,3,4, Z  ≡{ (z s,z l) :
z s = 0, 0 < z l < N}} in the trust game, for all |SI| =( 0,1,...,n) and I ∈ L.
Proof. Observe ﬁrst that z1, z2, z3 and z4 are the all monomorphic states of dynamics
(1)-(2). By A3, no shift in strategy can take place from these states, as players cannot
imitate unplayed strategies. Thus, z1, z2, z3 and z4 are all absorbing states under both
random and selective matching.
On the other hand, a polymorphic state cannot be absorbing under random
matching. Let z  ∈ Z be a polymorphic state. z  is a candidate to stationarity only
if players of the same population earn identical payoff in using different strategies.
Suppose that this is the case. As, by assumption, there is always positive probability
that all players I ∈ L (respectively i ∈ S) choose the same strategy in BL(t − 1)
(BS(t −1)), forcing the imitation dynamics to come back towards a monomorphic
state.
Consider now states z  ∈ Z  ≡{ (z s,z l) : z s = 0, 0 < z l < N}.A s 0 < z l
t < N,
player i’s strategy is xit =(E,J) with the restriction J ∈LCo,t ≡{I ∈L:XIt =Co}  L.
This means that all R-users denoted K / ∈ LCo,t are avoided by selective short-run
players at t. In the trust game, we then have ΠJt = |SJ,t|B > ΠKt = 0a s|SJ,t| > 0.
Following imitation rule, players K / ∈ LCo,t should imitate strategy Co in subsequent
15periods τ > t. However, by construction, all players i ∈ S will continue to imitate
xit =( E,J) with J ∈ LCo,t ≡{ I ∈ L : XIt =Co}, so that imitation of Co by K / ∈ LCo,t
cannot be revealed. Then, by A2, XKτ = XKt = R for some τ > t,s ot h a tzτ = z 
t,
meaning that states z 
t ∈ Z  are absorbing in the trust game.
In the ultimatum game, on the contrary, one observes ΠJt = |SJ,t|B < ΠKt = 0a s
B < 0i ns t a t e sz  ∈ Z . Then, players J ∈ LCo,t shift to R during periods τ > t and this
is revealed here since these players were selected at t by short-run players (and they
continue to imitate this strategy). Thus, states z  ∈ Z  are not absorbing states in the
ultimatum game. 
The previous result indicates that, under random matching, an absorbing state of
the dynamics has to be monomorphic, and that all monomorphic states are absorbing
states. This comes from the speciﬁcation of the imitation dynamics, in particular
Assumption 3. No mutation is needed to move from any polymorphic state to an
absorbing state, so that a LRE must be monomorphic when players meet at random.
On the contrary, under selective matching some polymorphic states can be absorbing
in the trust game, as mentioned above. The intuition behind this result is that a R-user
at t−1 who tries to revise his choice at t cannot be revealed due to the structure of the
game as discussed above. This will be no longer true with perturbations introduced by
mutations. These perturbations will allow us to see the somewhat fragile stability of
polymorphic states z  ∈ Z  in the trust game.
Notice that, under selective matching and without mutation, it could happen that
not all long-run players are selected in absorbing states in which zs = 0, i.e, in states
where all short-run players play E.22 In such states, without mutation, players only
imitate strategies used in the past (which means here an action and a long-run player)
22 This is underlined in the statement of Proposition 1 by specifying for all possible cardinality of
subset SI and for all SI.
16without experimenting. As a result, if a long-run player is not selected in the initial
state (that is, not present in the strategy space of short-run players) it will not be in the
subsequent states. That will disappear when introducing mutation.
Consider now the possibility of mutations. According to Kandori and Rob (1995),
the LRE are those requiring the fewest mutations in the transitions between limit sets.
Here, the limit sets are singletons {z1}, {z2}, {z3}, {z4} and {z }∈Z  so that we are
interested by transitions between these absorbing states. Deﬁne ﬁrst an A-tree as a
collection of directed branches (A0,A1), with A1 the successor of A0,i nw h i c h
( 1 )e x c e p tf o rA, each limit set has a unique successor,
(2) there are no closed loops.
Let HA be the set of A-trees. The cost of transition between two limit sets A,A  ∈ A
is denoted by C(A,A ). This cost represents the minimum number of mutations to
achieve A  from A over time. The LRE are the states having minimum C(A,A ),t h a ti s





(A ,A  )∈h
C(A ,A  ). (3)
In words, the LRE are states whose minimum-cost trees are themselves minimum
across absorbing states.
3.1 The ultimatum game
In this section, we compute the long-run equilibria in the ultimatum game under both
matching scenarios. Consider ﬁrst the basic model of matching, that is the random
matching process. Then, we can state
Proposition 2 In the ultimatum game, z2 =( E,Co) is the LRE under random
23 See Kandori and Rob (1995), Proposition 4.
17matching.
Proof. We have to ﬁnd the minimum-cost trees that are themselves minimum across
absorbing states. From Proposition 1, we know that A = {{zq} : q = 1,2,3,4}.I t
will be shown that there exists an z2-tree hz2 such that C(hz2)=|A| = 4 whereas for
all zq  = z2 with zq ∈ A every zq-tree hzq implies C(hzq) > 4, so that z2 is the unique
solution to program (3).
Consider z3 =( E,R) and one mutation J ∈ L playing Co. Then, ΠJ = B > ΠI =C
∀I  = J, so that mutant J ∈ L is imitated and the system moves to z2 =( E,Co).I nt h e
same way, consider z4 =( O,Co) and one mutant j ∈ S playing E.A sπj = b > πi = a
∀i  = j,m u t a n tj generates imitation of E in population S. Thus, one mutation is
sufﬁcient to escape from both states z3 =( E,R) and z4 =( O,Co).
Assume now that the system is in z1 =( O,R). Notice that, due to the structure of
the game, one mutation J ∈ L playing Co cannot be revealed until it is matched with a
mutant j ∈ S playing E. In this event, ΠJ = B < ΠI = A ∀I  = J but πj = b > πi = a
∀i  = j.A s φ ∈ (0,1], there is a positive probability that all players i ∈ S adjust
their strategy towards E during the subsequent period, inducing a transition from
z1 =( O,R).
On the other hand, two mutations are not sufﬁcient to move from z2 =( E,Co).
Assume n ≥ 3. One mutation j ∈ S playing O cannot alone generate imitation since
πj = a < πi = b ∀i  = j; in the same way, a mutant J ∈ L playing R cannot operate a
transition as ΠJ = C < ΠI = B ∀I  = J. Further, two paired simultaneous mutations
(O in S and R in L) don’t induce a transition since mutant J ∈ L playing R cannot be
revealed by mutant j ∈ S playing O.
As a result, C(hz2)=4 as one mutation is required in each of both states z3 and z4
plus at least two mutations in z1, whereas C(hzq) > 4f o ra l lzq  = z2 (one mutation in
z3 and z4, plus more than two in z2), which completes the proof. 
18On the other hand, selective matching favors different behaviors in the long run,
that is
Proposition 3 In the ultimatum game, z1 =( O,R) is the LRE under selective
matching.
Proof. Unlike the random matching scenario, selective matching allows the system to
escape from z2 =( E,Co) with only one mutation, but leaves unchanged the number of
mutations required in other states. As a result, C(hz1)=3 whereas for all zq  = z1 with
zq ∈A every zq-tree hzq implies C(hzq) > 3.
Consider that the system is in z2 =( E,Co) at t and suppose that one mutation
J ∈ L playing R occurs at the same time. In this event, one observes ΠJt = |SJ,t|C <
ΠIt = |SI,t|B ∀I  = J,a sA > B >C and by A1 |SJ,t| = |SI,t|. At the next period, mutant
J ∈ L is not imitated. However, selective short-run players will avoid strategy (E,J) as
πj < πi with xjt =( E,J) ∀i  = j (i.e, they avoid mutant J ∈ L) so that, even if mutant
J ∈L changes its strategy (returns toCo)a tt, this is not revealed. By A2, players I  =J
will consider that XJτ = R (the last observable strategy) with ΠJτ = A (the last realized
payoff). Then they have to compare ΠJτ = A = 0t oΠIτ = |SJ,t|B during periods τ >t.
As B <0 in the ultimatum game, players I  =J start to imitate strategy R, which in turn
generates imitation of O in S.
On the other hand, selective matching does not change the number of mutations
necessary to escape from z1 =( O,R). Afresh one mutant J ∈ L playing Co cannot be
revealed until it is matched with a mutant j ∈ S playing E. When this occurs, there is
a positive probability that all players i ∈ S imitate xjt =( E,J) as πj > πi ∀i = j,w h i c h
induces a transition from z1 =( O,R) towards state z  ∈ Z .
Finally, observe that one mutation is sufﬁcient to escape from both states z3 =
(E,R) and z4 =( O,Co), even under selective matching, so thatC(hz1)=3 whereas for
19all zq  = z1 with zq ∈A every zq-tree hzq implies C(hzq) > 3. 
The stronger stability of state z1 =( O,R) under selective matching comes from
the possibility for short-run players to (1) avoid long-run players using R and (2) select
long-run players using Co.A sar e s u l t ,Co-users always confront entries whereas R-
users are protected by selective matching which permits them to realize the highest
gain in population L. Selective short-run players lead then the imitation dynamics to
favor strategy R at the expenses of strategy Co. Unlike random matching, selective
matching may support reputation formation in the ultimatum game by preventing the
random entries in games where long-run players reject cooperation.
3.2 The Trust game
We now turn to the trust game. Unlike the ultimatum game, the presence of selective
short-run players cannot here support reputation effects. This is stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 In the trust game, z1 =( O,R) is the LRE under both random and
selective matching processes.
Proof. Notice ﬁrst that one mutation is sufﬁcient to escape from both states z3 =(E,R)
and z4 =( O,Co).I nz3 =( E,R), one mutation j ∈ S playing O realizes a better payoff
as πj = a > πi = c ∀i  = j. Similarly, one mutation j ∈ S playing E from z4 =( O,Co)
earns πj = b > πi = a ∀i  = j.
From Proposition 1, we know that under selective matching we have also to
consider absorbing states z  ∈Z  ≡{(z s,z l):z s =n, 0<z l < N}. Here, one mutation
xjt =( E,K) in population S with K ∈ LR ≡{ I ∈ L : XI = R} is sufﬁcient to reveal
that player K has changed his strategy and play now Co, so that the system escapes
from z  ∈ Z (recall that, in the trust game, Co earns a higher proﬁt when confronted to
selective short-run players).
20Consider now state z1 =( O,R). From this state, one mutation J ∈ L playing Co
cannot be revealed until it is matched with a mutant j ∈ S playing E. In this event, one
observes ΠJ = B > ΠI = A ∀I  = J and πj = b > πi = a ∀i  = j, and the system will end
in a state near to z1 =( O,R), in which all players in S will select mutant J ∈ L.E v e n
if other players in L imitate strategy Co, this shift in strategy towards Co will become
effective only in presence of other mutations in S, meaning that a complete transition
from z1 =( O,R) requires even more than two paired mutations.
It remains to show that one mutation can induce a transition from z2 =( E,Co).
Consider a mutation J ∈ L playing R.A s ΠJ = C > ΠI = B ∀I  = J, mutation J
generates imitation in population L during the subsequent periods. Consequently,
C(hz1)=3+|Z | with |Z |=N−2, whereasC(hzq)>N+1f o ra l lzq  = z1 with zq ∈A,
and C(hz ) > N +1f o ra l lz  ∈ Z ,s ot h a tz1 =( O,R) is the LRE. 
The idea behind Proposition 4 is the following. Recall ﬁrst that, in the trust game,
z2 =(E,Co)isPareto-dominant but does not constitute aNash equilibrium. Asaresult,
a long-run player using strategy R from state z2 =( E,Co) earns immediately a higher
payoff than Co-users. This player may then initialize imitation of R in population L.
Unlike the ultimatum game, selective short-run players play no role here. As
φ ∈ (0,1], there is always a positive probability that strategy R is imitated by all long-
run players before the reaction of selective short-run players. Indeed, selective short-
run players once informed could (1) avoid R-users and (2) select Co-users as a matter
of priority indicating that strategyComay realize the best payoff in population L.T h i s
means that considering that selective short-run players always learn more quickly than
long-run players may have an incidence on the result in Proposition 4. However, this
requires also additional assumptions as regards the imitation rule as considering only
cases in which short-run players adjust their strategy before or inﬁnitely faster than the
long-run players. It seems to us that such assumptions are too extreme to be considered
21as satisfactory.
4 Discussion and extensions
4.1 Random versus selective short-run players
The main result of our model suggests that long-run equilibria in GOO depend on
the matching process speciﬁcations, in particular whether it is selective or random
for short-run players. Thus, one may ask what sustains the presence of selective
short-run players in these games. More precisely, the important questions are:
which context favors the existence of selective compared to random short-run players
under evolutionary competition? Can both types of short-run players coexist in the
population? In order to answer these questions, notice that the main difference
between both types of short-run players relies on information players have to gather
in the imitative process. Both player types have to consider the payoff earned and
the associated strategy. However, as a strategy for a selective player is constituted
by two elements (an action and a long-run player) we could suppose that gathering
information for a selective player has an added cost relatively to a random type.
Models on evolutionary competition between player types (see Stahl (1993),
Barnerjee and Weibull (1995), Heller (2004)) naturally postulates that higher informed
players incur a cost in learning compared to others. This literature has shown that,
depending on the nature of the game, informed types can either come to dominate the
population, become extinct or coexist along with less-informed types. In these models,
the question is addressed in symmetric normal form games. Reputation games we
studied in this paper are asymmetric games. Thus, the analysis regarding evolutionary
competition between selective and random short-run players constitutes an interesting
extension of this paper.
224.2 Selective matching and the myopa assumption
Evolutionary models consider myopic and adaptive players, that is to say agents who
do not form expectations about the future course of play and simply take into account
the decisions made in the past to determine their strategies. In order to justify myopa,
evolutionary game theory assumes large population of players randomly matched. As
agents are randomly paired, the incitive to try to alter the future play of opponents is
small enough to be negligible. But at the same time, due to the random matching of
players, reputation effects are ruled out by evolutionary models. Thus, at ﬁrst glance,
using evolutionary gametheory to investigate reputation effects mayappear as counter-
intuitive.
As we have seen in Section 1, evolutionary models have evolved to incorporate
selective consideration in matching, which in turn is part of many economic situations.
When therandom matching assumption isweakened, atleast in part, inertia is theother
assumption justifying myopa in evolutionary models. Evolutionary models assume
that not all agents react instantaneously to their environment but rather gradually adjust
their strategy following the selection mechanism. Thisis agood justiﬁcation ofmyopic
behavior: as players know that only a small segment of agents change their actions,
strategies that prove to be effective today are likely to remain effective in the near
future.
4.3 The related literature
Our model may be related to the evolutionary literature on equilibrium selection24 and,
in particular, to Nöldeke and Samuelson (1993) and Binmore et al. (1995). They show
how evolutionary models provide support to experimental outcomes, and thus how
they can yield outcomes that signiﬁcantly differ from subgame perfection.
24On the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem, see
Samuelson (1997).
23Other evolutionary analyses have considered reputation effects. For instance,
Burke and Prasad (2002) study the emergence of institutions that facilitate lending
within the context of a reputational model of debt. In traditional models, lending
can occur in equilibrium because players value the credit relationship itself. Burke
and Prasad (2002) generalize the repeated model of sovereign debt to a population
game with several borrowers and lenders, that is a situation in which the value of a
relationship with any single partner is diminished. Another study using evolutionary
game theory in a reputational context is Abreu and Sethi (2003). They start by
observing that literature on reputation in games uses boundedly rational players,
leaving unexplained the presence of such players in the analysis as well as the
particular forms of irrationality assumed. Investigating the relative survival of various
behavioral types, they show that the presence of nonrational or behavioral types are
necessary to evolutionary stability.
Finally, the idea of selective matching in reputational games is close enough to
Hörner (2002). Heconsiders asituation inwhich consumers can only assess thequality
of a seller’s product by purchasing and consuming it (i.e., experience good markets).
Unlike the traditional analysis, he investigates such a situation in a competitive
environment where many consumers and ﬁrms repeatedly trade. Consumers have an
outside option represented by the possibility to freely switch ﬁrms at any time. In this
setting, he shows how competition supports the existence of equilibria in which ﬁrms
always exert high effort.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper investigated reputation in population games with an outside option
considering both imitation of success and selective matching. Contrary to the random
model, we ﬁnd that selective matching, by allowing short-run players to select the
long-run player they play against, sustains the equilibrium traditionally associated to
24reputation formation in the ultimatum game, but not in the trust game.
Games with an outside option are representative of many economic situations in
which reputation effects play a crucial role. In these games, selective matching is
a natural assumption since in the ﬁrst stage one player selects whether to play a
game with a second player or not. A useful extension of the present paper would
be to investigate the survival of the two types of short-run players under evolutionary
competition, adding a cost to selective (and more rational) short-run players. This is
left to future work.
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